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The emotive, polarised nature of contemporary politics is now widely recognised and 
reflects what is called the ‘affective turn’ in political studies (Demertzis, 2013; 
Lilleker, 2014; Richards, 2007, 2017; Thompson and Hoggett, 2012; Yates, 2015). 
Psychoanalytic theory has much to contribute to this emerging field of study. Whether 
one is discussing the UK decision to leave European Union or the love or loathing of 
politicians such as Donald Trump, psychoanalytic accounts of affect and emotion are 
especially useful because they can shed light on the powerful and seemingly irrational 
feelings that are experienced in such political contexts.  
The emotionalisation of contemporary politics is linked to a number of factors 
that include the mediatisation of politics and the rise of new methods of political 
communication that stir up the emotions and enable their expression through social 
media and interactive media platforms. Such developments tap into the socio-
economic forces of globalisation, war, the displacement of people and the emotional 
experience of precarity that has emerged as a consequence of such developments 
(Standing, 2011). The loss of faith in the political narratives that once shaped 
collective identities within national and global contexts has created fear and 
uncertainty and a distrust of the other. In Western democracies, the growth of emotive 
single-issue identity politics has also contributed to the emotionalisation of the 
contemporary political scene and coincides with what some refer to as ‘therapy’ 
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culture’ (Richards, 2007), where the erosion of the boundaries between personal and 
public experience has led to an increasingly personalised, emotive style and content of 
political culture today. The growth of a celebrity orientated, promotional style of 
political culture has also played a role in this process, contributing to the 
personalisation of politics and its leaders, helping to shape the experience of political 
citizenship in affective terms (Yates, 2015).  
The emotional dynamics of Western political culture are present in the 
populist style and content of party politics and its related campaigns, as for example 
in the UK Referendum on membership of the EU in 2016 (referred to as ‘Brexit’), or 
during the 2016 US Presidential election Donald Trump’s emotional rallying call to 
‘Make America great again’. The emotive nationalist-populism1 of those two 
campaigns and their aftermath echo a wider shift in democratic political systems in 
Europe that were evident in election campaigns in the Netherlands and Hungary in 
2016 and France in 2017, where populist right-wing candidates mobilised support 
through highly emotive campaigns that fed fears about immigration and the loss of 
national identity.2  
This chapter explores the complexity of the relationship between politics, 
affect and emotion through an analysis that draws on different psychoanalytic 
perspectives in order to examine the affective dynamics of Brexit in the UK and the 
rise of Donald Trump and his appeal in the US, where the emotive language of love, 
                                                        
1 Populism is a contested term (Canovan, 1999), but historian Michael Kazin (1998: 1) 
defines populism as ‘a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble 
assemblage not bounded narrowly by class; view their elite opponents as self-serving and 
undemocratic; and seek to mobilise the former against the latter’. The emotional dimensions 
of populism and its relationship to processes of affect and unconscious fantasy are discussed 
in this chapter.  
2 The leaders of these right wing campaigns included the Dutch politician Geert Wilders of 
the Party for Freedom, Norbert Hofer of the Hungarian Freedom Party and Marine Le Pen of 
the French National Front party. 
 3 
hate and desire was, in various ways, used to court the electorate. Whilst political 
sociology (Salmela and Von Scheve, 2014) and political cognitive psychology 
(Lilleker, 2014) address the significance of emotion in political campaigns and in the 
political field more widely, a psychoanalytic reading of affect and politics allows for a 
nuanced understanding of the hidden psychical forces that drive the mobilisation of 
affect in campaigns such as Brexit or the election of Donald Trump. It enables the 
researcher to explore the layers of feeling that may influence the support for a 
political position or politician such as Donald Trump, by providing a lens through 
which to examine the context of that support through the analysis of unconscious 
desires, fantasies and affects that emerge as a response to the losses of identity in the 
late modern world. 
In order to clarify the terms of the discussion, the chapter begins by 
introducing the meanings of emotion and affect when applied to the field of politics, 
and it then applies the ideas of Jacques Lacan to the affective political terrain of 
nationalism and the 2016 UK referendum to leave Europe. The chapter then turns to 
object relations theory by applying the ideas of Melanie Klein to examine the 
affective, gendered dynamics of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 US Presidential election 
campaign; the ideas of Donald Woods Winnicott (1971) and Christopher Bollas 
(1987) are then discussed in relation to the appeal of Donald Trump as a psychosocial 
object of attachment for his followers.  
Psychoanalytic understandings of emotion and affect 
The relationship between politics, affect and emotion is both complex and contested 
and the two terms ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ are sometimes used interchangeably to 
denote conscious and unconscious states of feeling. Nonetheless, from a 
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psychoanalytic perspective, it is generally agreed that whilst emotions are rooted in 
social and historical discourse and ideas, it always carries with it traces of conflict that 
are shaped by the dynamic forces of the unconscious (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008; 
Thompson and Hoggett, 2012). Freud (1915) linked the concept of ‘affect’ to his 
notion of repression, which he argued was also bound up with the hidden desires and 
conflicts of the Oedipus complex. It is sometimes said that people experience 
‘unconscious emotions’, and yet from a psychoanalytic perspective, it is the forbidden 
idea (as in the desire to murder one’s father), which is repressed and not the 
experience of affect itself. Thus the anger or rivalrous feeling once connected with a 
wish to murder one’s father becomes displaced and linked to the experience of anger 
towards something or someone else - such as the anger felt towards one’s boss or to a 
political leader. So whilst emotions are linked to unconscious processes, it is the idea 
and not the feeling of affect that is repressed. As Lacan (2007: 189) argued: ‘affect 
through the fact of displacement is effectively displaced, unidentified, broken off 
from its roots - it eludes us’.   
In this chapter then, the unconscious aspects of emotional experience are 
defined as affect which for Lacan (1977) is bound up with the workings of desire and 
the law of the father, for Melanie Klein (1957) in the powerful ambivalent feelings 
and fantasies that are stirred up in relation to early infantile fantasies of the mother, 
and for Winnicott (1971) who also foregrounded the significance of the mother, the 
experience of love and sometimes hate that creates a potential space for hope, trust 
and meaningful communication with others. Whilst these three psychoanalytic 
perspectives on affect draw on different traditions,3 they nonetheless share a 
                                                        
3 Klein and Winnicott both belong to the British school of object relations psychoanalysis and 
yet there are differences of emphasis between the two, as Winnicott focuses less on innate 
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psychoanalytic concern with unconscious affective processes that find symbolic 
expression through the subject’s relationship to real and imagined others.  
Freud (1921, 1930) and subsequent psychoanalytic writers remind us that the 
psychodynamics of affect extend beyond the experience of the individual to that of 
the group and society, so that the processes of affect play a role in shaping the ideas, 
norms and discourses of politics, culture and society at different moments in history. 
As Freud (1921: 95) argued: ‘the contrast between individual psychology and social 
or group psychology, which at a first glance may seem to be full of significance, loses 
a great deal of its sharpness when it is examined more closely’. Thus, a key aspect of 
the approach taken here is that psychoanalytic understandings of politics interweave 
with those from the sphere of culture, politics and society. With that psychosocial 
orientation in mind, it is important to pay attention to the social, cultural and 
unconscious levels of affective politics throughout the course of the discussion. 
 
Politics, affect and desire in the UK referendum campaign 
Fuelled by the forces of social media and late modern methods of political 
communication, emotions play a significant important role in shaping the dynamics of 
late modern political culture (Demertzis, 2013; Lilleker, 2014). Freud (1921) argued 
that such emotional group processes are bound up with the experience of narcissistic 
identification both with other members of the group and through the idealisation of 
the leader as the symbolic father. Freud traced these desires and identifications back 
                                                                                                                                                              
drives and instincts and more on the subject’s psychosocial relationship with the environment. 
Both Klein and Lacan emphasise the importance of the drive (see: Borossa, Bronstein and 
Pajaczkowska, 2015).  
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to the Oedipus complex and the fantasy father is key to Freud’s thinking in this 
respect. Freud’s emphasis on the significance of narcissism and also the father in 
shaping subjectivity and group experience is also foregrounded in Lacan’s theory of 
the affective subject - albeit in symbolic form through language and systems of 
representation. Derek Hook (2011) deploys Lacanian theory in order to examine the 
relationship between affect and identification in nationalist political contexts.4 Hook’s 
methodology is useful for a political analysis of affect because he escapes the 
potential a-historic universalism of a psychoanalytic approach that essentialises it as a 
libidinal force divorced from the realm of ideas and discourse in which it operates. 
Instead, he mobilizes a psychosocial reading of affect that sees it as functioning 
within and across different levels of political experience that include excessive 
libidinal affect on the one hand and on the other-the inherited symbolic structures of 
history, culture and society.  
Lacan identified three registers of the psyche and experience that include 
firstly, the libidinal level of the ‘Real’, secondly, the level of the ‘Imaginary’ that is 
associated with the narcissistic identifications of the mirror phase, and thirdly, the 
‘Symbolic’ mode of identification that is linked to the patriarchal structures of history, 
culture and society and one’s place in the social order (Lacan, 1997, 1977). Like 
Lacan, Hook emphasises the interaction of these three registers and applies them to 
affective modes of political identification, using nationalism as a focus to examine 
ways in which these identifications operate. A good example of such affective 
processes at work in a nationalist context could be seen in the 2016 UK Brexit 
campaign, when the day after the vote to leave the European Union in June of that 
                                                        
4 In psychoanalysis, identification’ refers to the formation of the subject through the process 
of ‘taking in’ the other. 
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year, the former UK Independence Party (UKIP) Leader, Nigel Farage announced 
portentously to the assembled press that ‘The dawn is breaking on an independent 
United Kingdom’ (Williams, 2016). In that speech, Nigel Farage mobilised the 
emotional discourse of populism to say that this was a ‘victory’ for ‘the real people, 
for the ordinary people, for the decent people’ (Ibid.). Here, the affective dimensions 
of Nigel Farage’s speech intersect with socio-cultural discourses and historical 
prejudices about Europe that are condensed through the trope of the ‘plucky 
Englishmen’ rising up against the mythical foe of Europe. One can see the processes 
of the unconscious at work in this instance because whilst Nigel Farage’s words 
express a desire for national unity against the other of Europe, that desire also 
resonates unconsciously with an imaginary desire for unity with the other (which 
paradoxically, could be the same other as Europe) – a desire that is linked to the 
identification with the ego ideal of the mirror phase (Lacan, 1977: 1-8). In other 
words, the imaginary desire for the other (which could be the imagined community of 
the UK or, as indicated - Europe) is also bound up with feelings of rivalry and 
aggression towards the other who threatens to disturb the fantasy of unity with the 
ego ideal (Ibid). 
Robert Samuels (2016) argues that the ‘duality’ between self and other that 
operates unconsciously in the register of the imaginary is often powerfully present in 
the current forces of right wing nationalist politics. He says that against a 
contemporary political backdrop of fear, risk and economic uncertainty, the 
unpredictable and aggressive forces of the imaginary operate and shape group 
identity. As we have seen, these unconscious forces were present in UKIP’s campaign 
to leave the EU and Nigel Farage’s disavowal of the anger and symbolic violence of 
his own campaign to leave Europe provide a further instance of the ways in which 
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affect shapes the language of political culture and the fantasies that circulate within it. 
For example, in Nigel Farage’s 2016 speech following the UK Referendum, he said 
that they had won the vote to leave the European Union without ‘a single bullet being 
fired’ (Williams, 2016). This claim ignored the fact that Jo Cox, the pro-remain 
Labour MP for the constituency, Bately and Spen, was murdered by a member of an 
extreme right-wing nationalist party called ‘Britain First’ and that this murder 
occurred on the day that Farage unveiled a UKIP campaign poster that was widely 
condemned by MPs and by the public as inciting racial hatred (Stone, 2016). The 
poster, which some have likened to images of Nazi propaganda, depicts a long, 
winding queue of what seems to be mainly non-white migrants and refugees with the 
words: ‘Breaking point: the EU has failed us all’ (Stewart and Mason, 2016). The 
affective dynamics of politics that I have discussed were manifest in that UKIP poster 
and were acted out through the murder of Jo Cox. The patriotic platitudes of UKIP 
and its flag-waving calls for national unity combined with an aggressive and rivalrous 
renunciation of difference as symbolised in the image of the foreign asylum seeker 
who is represented in that poster and in other promotional material as the ‘other’ and 
as threatening the identity of Britain and its citizens. In such imagery, the implied 
collapse of state boundaries elide with anxieties about the loss of psychic boundaries 
through the merging of the self with an omnipotent other.  
The UKIP discourse of Brexit was also gendered in its emotional appeal, 
tapping into the identification with the fantasy of the father and a return to a 
traditional order of paternal inheritance. As with other UK male politicians such as 
Boris Johnson who campaigned to leave Europe, Nigel Farage’s seductive brand of 
traditional, retro-sexual English masculinity was for some a significant factor in 
appealing to voters and getting his message across. As a progressive, pro-European 
 9 
female MP and mother, Jo Cox represented the very opposite, and her femininity was 
a marked cultural signifier of difference in that respect. For many of her constituents 
and colleagues, she was widely admired as applying an empathic approach to her 
work as a Member of Parliament (BBC News, 2016). Her public persona 
foregrounded her cultural and political identity as a woman and politician whose 
passionate advocacy of vulnerable groups both in her constituency and in Syria, 
marked her out as different to what Irigaray called the ‘same’ of a masculinized 
public political sphere that remains patriarchal in terms of its tone, attitude and gender 
balance (Irigaray and Guynn, 1995).   
 
Politics and affect; object relations perspectives  
The affective forces of right-wing nationalist politics with its deployment of 
emotive populist tropes (as in the UKIP Brexit campaign) are often driven by the 
dynamics of envy, rivalry and narcissism, and object relations psychoanalysis 
provides a useful analytical framework to explore such processes. From an object 
relations perspective, the development of subjectivity is bound up with the emotional 
experience of relating to objects, and its theories have been applied to the sphere of 
politics and emotion in the UK and the US (Hoggett, 2015; Layton, 2006; Richards, 
2007, 2015; Yates, 2015; 2018). From this standpoint, the ego is shaped from birth by 
the excesses of unconscious fantasy and the experience of affect is always bound up 
with relationships to real and imagined objects of both the mind and the environment. 
As the name implies, object relations theory is concerned with the relational dynamics 
of subjectivity and whilst those such as Melanie Klein (1946) focus on the instinctual 
roots of fantasy and its relationship to the embodied experience of affect, others such 
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as Winnicott (1971), foreground the interactive nature of relating to the object and the 
mother as the first psychosocial object. As I discuss, the ideas of both Klein and 
Winnicott can be used to examine the affective dynamics of politics in the 21st 
Century.  
Fantasies of the phallic mother in political culture 
The conscious and unconscious envy of women in the public political sphere can be 
explored using the ideas of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein (1946, 1957). Her theories 
of affect and the unconscious emphasise the embodied and often destructive nature of 
emotional experience and fantasy that are present from birth. For Klein and others 
influenced by her work (Segal, 1988), affective experience has its roots in the 
fantasies 5 of the mother in the first months of life. Klein argued that infants are born 
into the world with a capacity for envy, which is linked to life and death drives. The 
feelings of envy that she describes are related to the helpless dependency of the infant 
who begins life in what she called ‘the paranoid schizoid’ position where the world is 
viewed through a split world of idealised good and bad objects. The infant protects 
itself by developing defence mechanisms that include splitting, projection and 
projective identification (expelling unwanted anxieties onto the other and then 
responding to those projections), and envious attacks on the maternal object who is 
the source of life and food (but who also has the power to take it away). Gradually, 
however, the paranoid schizoid mode of processing experience gives way to the 
depressive position, where the child learns to manage paranoid anxiety and cope with 
the loss of omnipotence and manage the complexity of emotional ambivalence. 
However, the states of mind associated with the paranoid schizoid and depressive 
                                                        
5 Klein (1957) referred to unconscious fantasy as ‘phantasy’. However, for purposes of 
consistency, this chapter uses the term ‘fantasy’ throughout.  
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positions continue to influence the ways in which the subject relates to the world 
(Klein, 1957).   
Klein’s ideas are evocative when applied to the discourse and culture of 
politics in an era of right wing populism where, for example, anxieties about the 
boundaries of the nation state also resonate with mental states of citizens and the 
boundaries of the mind (Richards, 2017). One can develop the application of these 
ideas in order to examine the unwanted feelings that are projected onto the despised 
and abject other and also the splitting of countries and ethnic groups into categories of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. There are numerous examples where one can arguably see such 
processes at work that are not exclusive to the phenomena of right-wing nationalism 
and the exploitation of populist sentiment and expression. Nonetheless, one can argue 
that the concept of projection as discussed by Klein and others resonates powerfully 
when applied to images of the UKIP Brexit campaign and the paranoid schizoid mood 
that surfaced and which continued to find expression subsequently in Brexit 
negotiations and in related media commentary. In that media environment, opposing 
views about the exit from Europe were split into ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ positions and the 
sections press labelled opponents of the government stance as ‘traitors’ (Morris, 
2017).  
The psychoanalytic conceptual framework of Klein, with its emphasis on the 
fantasy of the omnipotent mother, is highly evocative when applied to the affective, 
gendered identifications that are mobilised in relation to political leaders in different 
contexts. Just as Lacan’s theory of the symbolic father can be used to examine the 
unconscious phallic appeal of male leaders such as Donald Trump, a Kleinian 
perspective can be helpful when exploring fantasies of the female leader as an 
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overbearing, persecutory or withholding mother. To escape charges of essentialism, 
such an approach needs to be interwoven with an attention to the historical and socio-
political specificities of time and place. Nonetheless, this mode of analysis is useful 
when discussing cultural anxieties about female politicians who are demonised as 
risky, over-emotional or somehow unnatural because they are not emotional enough – 
as in the case of Hillary Clinton, who has been variously criticised for being hard, 
‘nasty’, calculating, ‘inhuman’ and cold (Bordo, 2016). As is well documented, whilst 
male politicians such as Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Vladamir Putin can shed tears 
in public and also show a so-called ‘softer’ or ‘human’ side by identifying themselves 
as fathers and family men (Yates, 2012), women have a different psycho-political and 
cultural settlement with the public and must be wary of using those strategies in case 
they appear too vulnerable and prone to risk (Evans, 2009).   
The 2016 US election provided a good example of the gendered division of 
emotion within the public arena of political culture. As Thompson and Yates (2016) 
argue, there was a marked contrast in the ‘embodied attributes and emotions’ that 
were ascribed to each candidate. In particular, they note that whilst Donald Trump 
was in fact the older candidate with respiratory problems (for example, wheezing in 
his public debates) and showing a poor recall for facts (Graham, 2016), it was 
Clinton’s age and physical frailty that dominated press reports of her throughout the 
election. Against a well-documented backdrop of social uncertainty and risk (Beck, 
1992, Bauman, 2000), it was as if the political body of the electorate managed their 
fears of fragmentation by projecting them onto ‘the image of corrupt and abject 
political body’ of Clinton herself whose body became a focus for cultural anxieties 
about late modernity and social change (Thompson and Yates, 2016). 
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The construction of Clinton as cold and devoid of human warmth and emotion 
reinforced an impression of her as being untrustworthy and false - as in Trump’s ugly 
name for her - ‘crooked Hillary’. The representation of Clinton as an unfeeling 
political ‘crook’ who merely reproduced the old neoliberal order, contrasted both with 
the apparent authenticity of fellow Democrat politician Bernie Saunders’ un-spun, 
left-of-centre populist appeal and also with the image of Donald Trump’s emotionally 
charged address to the so-called ‘left behind’ voters who looked to him to save them 
from a bleak future of social and economic precarity. The notion of the ‘left behind’ 
voter was a term coined by the political scientists, Ford and Goodwin  (2014) to 
describe the demographic grouping who supported UKIP and other right-wing parties, 
who felt ignored by the government, resented globalisation and whose cultural values 
were deemed old fashioned and even distasteful by those in power. The debate about 
the left behinds can be framed economically in terms of those who have not benefited 
from neoliberalism (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2016) and in the 
US the debate is often framed in terms of race (Coates, 2017). Some have also noted 
the significance of the cultural and educational divide between these groups and the 
power and privilege of those who in popular discourse are referred to in pejorative 
terms as the ‘metropolitan elite’ (Goodhart, 2017).6  
There is a close analogy between the UK ‘left-behind’ group of citizens and 
those in the US. Both groups helped to fuel the populist protest that in the UK swayed 
the Brexit vote and which in the US helped to bring Donald Trump in to power 
(Hochschild, 2016). Donald Trump used the term ‘left behind’ in his campaigns and 
                                                        
6 In the UK, the concept of the ‘metropolitian elite’ was widely used to discredit the 
government backed pro-remain campaigners. See, for example, this article in the pro-Brexit 
UK Newspaper, The Daily Mail: ‘Metropolitan elite out of touch with ordinary “ghastly” 
Britons’ (Drury, 2016). 
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in his inauguration speech in relation to what he said were ‘the millions and millions 
of workers left behind’ (The Telegraph, 2017). The concept of being ‘left behind’ is 
an affectively powerful one that connotes being ‘left out’,7 unloved, dropped and 
ignored by those political leaders who are meant to take care of you. The perception 
by large groups of people in the UK in relation to Brexit and by Donald Trump 
supporters in the US of being ignored by mainstream parties and governments was 
and is not without foundation, and it rests on a complex mix of factors related to 
material inequality and anxieties about cultural difference. And yet, the excessive 
affective force of hatred and vitriol that was and continues to be directed toward 
Hillary Clinton as a member of the elite also brings to mind the affective fantasies of 
the monstrous maternal body discussed by Klein with reference to the paranoid 
schizoid position. Here, one can argue that Clinton’s positioning as a member of the 
elite taps into an envious fantasy of the corrupt political body reproducing itself at the 
expense of the electorate and keeping all the political goodness to itself.  Clinton’s 
femininity seems to reinforce this perverse image of mechanical reproduction in an 
age of promotional politics, a fantasy image that is represented as both unnatural (as 
discussed above) and yet somehow inevitable. From this perspective, one could say 
that Clinton’s status as the wife of the former President, Bill Clinton contributes to an 
envious fantasy of exclusion from the all-powerful Oedipal couple who are both 
preoccupied with themselves ‘and their kind’ and who seem to care little for those 
economically and culturally left behind (Hochschild, 2016). The widespread rumour 
that Hillary Clinton sanctioned and therefore ‘enabled’ her husband’s sexual infidelity 
(Twohey, 2016) not only reinforces a fantasy of her ruthless, phallic femininity but it 
                                                        
7 Obama referred to this group as ‘folks who feel left out’ (King, 2016).  
 
 15 
also evokes the unconscious scenario of the omnipotent ‘combined parent’ discussed 
by Klein in her exploration of infantile helplessness and paranoid schizoid states of 
mind (Segal, 1988: 108-9). 
Shame, the good parent and fantasies of attachment 
In contrast to Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump was able to project a political persona 
that for his followers that was both exiting and affirming.  As a glamorous, high -
profile entrepreneur in the US who has been in the public eye since the1980s, he 
consolidated his status as a celebrity businessman on the US version of the reality 
show, The Apprentice (2014-15). His identity as an icon of popular television 
indicates the extent to which celebrity culture and politics are now closely imbricated 
and the myth of his competence stemmed from his performance as the strong and 
decisive leader on that show (Yates, 2018). Richard Sennett (1976) argued that the 
development of personality-driven politics is also linked to the emergence of ‘secular 
charisma’, where the residual envy or ressentiment of voters in relation to powerful 
politicians in social democratic societies is warded off by focussing on the personality 
and image of politicians rather than substantial political issues and policies.8 This 
description is pertinent when applied to the affective appeal of Donald Trump at a 
time when in the lead-up to his election victory in 2016, the dynamics of nationalist 
populism and ressentiment converged with that of celebrity politics. Donald Trump 
showed his dexterity as a politician by deflecting onto Clinton the populist anger that 
was felt towards the establishment of which he (given his wealth and connections) 
was and is also part. Using the playful words that are reminiscent of 1950s Hollywood 
                                                        
8 Ressentiment is a contested term and its different uses are related to different philosophical 
traditions. From a psychoanalytic perspective, ressentiment can be used in a similar way to 
Melanie Klein’s concepts of envy and projective identification. For further discussion see: 
Clark (2006). 
 16 
B movies, Donald Trump deflected voters’ anger onto what he likes to call ‘The 
Swamp’ of ‘Washington insiders’ – a phrase which, like ‘build the wall’ or with 
reference to Hilary Clinton, ‘lock her up!’,  he and his followers like to chant in the 
manner of a school playground game, where the anger is used as a form of  bonding 
as any potential ressentiment aimed at him and his privilege is, in effect gathered up 
and projected elsewhere.   
During his election campaign, Donald Trump’s appeal as a leader was 
achieved in part through his glamour as a television personality, and also through a 
form of faux intimacy that he created as he offered himself up as an object of 
attachment for his supporters. Alongside the ritual chanting games at his rallies, his 
success was also linked to the passionate declarations of love and empathy that he 
seemed to have for those citizens who normally feel despised and unloved by 
establishment politicians such as Hillary Clinton who referred to them as ‘a basket of 
deplorables’.9 As Donald Trump said in his 2016 inauguration speech: ‘..Protection 
will lead to great prosperity and strength. I will fight for you with every breath in my 
body. And I will never ever let you down’ (The Telegraph, 2016). 
Donald Trump’s skill has arguably been to tap into a vein of shame amongst 
those citizens who cannot provide for their families and who reject or feel left behind 
by the forces of modernity, globalisation and the values of social liberalism. The 
discourse of shame and the fantasies that circulate in relation to it have been a 
recurrent motif in late modern politics in a number of contexts,10 and they have also 
                                                        
9 Clinton apologized for her comments the next day, see: CNN politics [online] 9 September 
2016. http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/09/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-basket-of-
deplorables/ [accessed 28 April 2017]. 
10 Including, for example, the unacknowledged debts of postcolonialism (Venn, 2006), of 
gender and sexuality (Munt, 2012) and the repressed shame of slavery upon which the 
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been articulated in relation to both Brexit and to the rise of Donald Trump. In both 
contexts, shame has played a role in stigmatising groups such as welfare and benefit 
claimants and refugees who are defined as abject, and who are made to carry that 
shame on behalf of others.  
Object relations psychoanalysis traces feelings of shame back to an early 
infantile stage of development when the very young child fails to be mirrored by its 
parent and this failure creates a narcissistic wound that provides the basis for the 
ontology of shame in later life (Mollon, 2002). This experience, which is linked to a 
failure of attachment, also resonates when applied to those citizens who feel rejected 
and misrecognised by the governing classes (Yates, 2018). Such a scenario provides a 
context for the appeal of Donald Trump for his supporters because despite his macho 
authoritarian persona, he nonetheless presents himself as an object for those seeking 
to identify with the image of the leader as a strong, caring and empathic provider.   
The idea of nation as a ‘transitional object’ is apt in this context. For 
Winnicott (1971), the latter is the infant’s first ‘not-me’ object, and its use helps the 
infant to move from his or her primary identification with the maternal object into a 
world of external objects. In so doing, it helps to bridge the divide that opens up when 
the infant perceives and begins to understand the outside world. One can argue that 
Donald Trump uses a nostalgic idea of nation in the form of a consoling transitional 
object that functions in a regressive fashion to manage the losses of identity that are 
also bound up with the object of the American Dream that cannot be mourned or let 
go (Yates, 2018). This argument can be extended through the application of 
Christopher Bollas’s (1987) theory of the transformational object. Bollas develops 
                                                                                                                                                              
American Dream was constructed (Schneiderman, 1996) and Refugees and Benefit claimants 
(Tyler, 2013). 
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Winnicott’s theory of the transitional object in order to explore the world of object 
relating and its role in shaping subjectivity. Bollas describes an earlier, more primary 
object relation for the infant, which he calls the ‘transformational object’. In pre-
verbal experience, the adaptation of the maternal figure to the infant’s needs 
transforms the infant’s experience from pain or anxiety to comfort and safety. This 
experience of the infant that is provided by the mother becomes unconsciously 
internalised as a transformational object.  
Winnicott (1960) said that at times of uncertainty and change, the outside 
world is experienced as an ‘impingement’. For many, Donald Trump seems to offer a 
secondary shield against that sense of impingement which, to extend further the 
language of Winnicott, contributes to a national ‘false self’ (1971) that functions as a 
defence against the imagined enemy that Trump himself creates. The avoidance of 
vulnerability through a public rhetoric of power is a recurring theme of contemporary 
politics more generally. When Donald Trump promises to restore the nation to some 
notion of its former glory, he seems to offer himself as a transformational object and 
yet this would be a distortion of the process that Bollas (1987) described (albeit in the 
context of child development). In the case of the latter, the experience of 
transformation is brought about by the mother’s adaptation to the needs and anxieties 
of her infant. Donald Trump’s version is not adaptation, but rather it is a defensive 
triumph over vulnerability and also the fantasies of dangerous femininity associated 
with the risk of the unreliable mother – as indicated above in the discussion of Hillary 
Clinton. In this way, his promise of transformation is essentially underpinned by 
control, and at the level of fantasy, its collective appeal seems to operate culturally as 
a form of manic defence against the unknown.   
Comment [Y1]: Check the syntax of 
this sentence... 
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Conclusion: The affective ties of political culture and its structures of feeling  
This chapter has used the psychoanalytic theories of Lacan, Klein, Winnicott and 
others such as Bollas to examine the affective processes of two nationalist-populist 
political campaigns that used the language of emotion to appeal to those sections of 
the public who feel alienated and left behind by the social, cultural and economic 
forces of globalisation in the late modern age. As we have seen, the emotions that are 
galvanised in those contexts also tap into deeper psychic structures and drivers of 
affect that are related to the dynamics of desire, rivalry, envy, love and loss.  
As discussed in the introduction, a significant factor in the affective dynamics 
of contemporary political culture is the mediatisation of politics and the role played 
by popular culture in helping to shape the emotional dynamics of political citizenship 
today. One can argue that the structures of subjectivity, popular culture and politics 
are closely interwoven and the cultural ‘glue’ or cement that links them are the 
feelings and emotions that shape subjectivity at any one time (Yates, 2015). The 
political events that I have discussed (of Brexit in the UK and the election of Donald 
Trump in the US) provide good examples of that process at work, because they were 
both shaped by the cultural forces of political culture in a media age. Citizens invest 
emotionally in political formations and also in the forms of common sense that 
emerge at different historical periods, which is an idea that draws on Raymond 
Williams’ (1977: 132) notion of a ‘structure of feeling’ as ‘thought as felt, and feeling 
as thought’. Thus, political culture provides the spaces in which cultural, political and 
emotional aspects of experience come together, and are continually shaped and 
symbolised. The symbols and signs that are created in that domain become a focus in 
the struggle for power, meaning and identity. In this way, the affective structures of 
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culture and identity are not external to the political sphere, but are very much part of 
it.  
As this chapter has shown, psychoanalysis provides a rich, conceptual and 
theoretical apparatus that allows us to capture the psychosocial and cultural 
mechanisms that produce the structures of feeling that shape the affective dynamics of 
political culture and its campaigns in the contemporary, late modern era. Applying 
theories of the unconscious allows one to go beyond the socio-economic and cultural 
accounts of the emotionalisation of politics and instead it enables us to confront the 
powerful psychodynamic currents and investments that underpin that process. Such an 
approach contributes to the emerging field of psycho-political studies, which is a 
timely move, given the complex and emotive nature of political culture today. 
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